IMMIGRATION and Refugee Board (IRB) member Geoff Rempel has ruled that Gurmej Singh Gill, a former Babbar Khalsa leader, is inadmissible to Canada.
Rempel in his April 2 decision said: “The evidence before me provides reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Gill was a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe has engaged in terrorism.”
He also issued a deportation order. Gill was notified that he could make an application to the Federal Court for judicial review of the decision, with leave of that Court.
Gill is a citizen of the United Kingdom. He became a permanent resident of Canada in 1982, but surrendered that status in 1984.
The hearing took place on February 26. The IRB was forwarded a report by the Canada Border Services Agency last year at the end of November saying that they believed Gill was inadmissible to Canada. Canada Border Services Agency is responsible for referring requests for admissibility hearing to the IRB, an independent administrative tribunal.
The allegation against Gill is 34(1)(f) Security of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act which states:
“34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
“(a) engaging in an act of espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests;
“(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
“(b.1) engaging in an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
“(c) engaging in terrorism;
“(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
“(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or
“(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (b.1) or (c).”
The ruling noted under “Issues”:
1. Is the Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International an organization?
2. Has the Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International engaged in terrorism?
3. Was Mr. Gill a member of the Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International?
Rempel noted: “Mr. Gill’s avowed commitment to following the laws of the UK and Canada, or his involvement in maintaining peaceful relations between Sikh activists and police, or his condemnation of the 9-11 attacks, or his association with government figures in the UK, or his moral character and personal commitment to non-violence, are not relevant to the determination of this case. The issue in this case is not whether Mr. Gill himself is a terrorist or sympathetic to terrorism, but that he was a member of an organization that engaged in terrorism.”
REASONS FOR DECISION
 This admissibility hearing was held with respect to Mr. Gurmej Singh Gill. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (“the Minister”) alleges that Mr. Gill is inadmissible to Canada on grounds of security, pursuant to paragraphs 34(1)(f) by (c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA” or “the Act”), which read as follows:
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
(c) engaging in terrorism;
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
 The Minister’s subsection 44(1) report confirms that in this case the paragraph 34(1)(f) allegation refers to paragraph 34(1)(c), not to paragraphs (a) or (b). As clarified by the Minister at the admissibility hearing, in this case the relevant organization is the Babbar Khalsa and/or the Babbar Khalsa International (“the BK” or “the BKI”).
 Mr. Gill is a citizen of the United Kingdom and was a permanent resident of Canada. When he recently tried to re-enter Canada, he was reported and referred for an admissibility hearing. For the admissibility hearing, the Minister submitted documentary evidence entered as Exhibits C1 – C3. Mr. Gill testified at the admissibility hearing and disclosed documentary evidence as Exhibits P1 and P2. Two other witnesses testified for Mr. Gill. Both parties provided oral submissions.
STANDARD OF PROOF
 Pursuant to section 33 of IRPA, the standard of proof in this case is “reasonable grounds to believe.” The “reasonable grounds to believe” standard has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada as requiring something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities. Reasonable grounds to believe exist where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information. This standard applies to questions of fact.
MR. GILL’S STATUS IN CANADA
 Mr. Gill concedes that he is not a Canadian citizen. He became a permanent resident of Canada in 1982, but surrendered that status in 1984. Though Mr. Gill did not concede his status as a foreign national, that issue is not determinative of this decision, as paragraph 34(1)(f) applies equally to permanent residents and foreign nationals.
1. Is the Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International an organization?
2. Has the Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International engaged in terrorism?
3. Was Mr. Gill a member of the Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International?
THE BABBAR KHALSA/BABBAR KHALSA INTERNATIONAL
 The Minister argues that the names “Babbar Khalsa” and “Babbar Khalsa International” are interchangeable and refer to the same organization, of which Mr. Gill was a member. Mr. Gill argues that various distinct and unconnected groups coincidentally have used the names Babbar Khalsa and Babbar Khalsa International, and that the Babbar Khalsa to which he belonged in the United Kingdom was unaffiliated with the Babbar Khalsa that is considered a terrorist organization.
 For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the evidence supporting the Minister’s view is stronger than that supporting Mr. Gill’s, and conclude that both names refer to the same, albeit loosely-structured, organization, of which Mr. Gill was a member.
 Although not agreeing entirely in certain particulars, as detailed below the vast majority of reports in evidence use the names Babbar Khalsa and Babbar Khalsa International interchangeably and treat them as the same organization or as branches of the same organization. For example, the Canadian government refers to the Babbar Khalsa International, “also known as Babbar Khalsa”, in its list of terrorist entities.
 Both parties provided in their disclosure copies of a report stating that the Babbar Khalsa was established in India in 1978 and comprised a mainline BK headed by Sukhdev Singh Babbar and an overseas wing called the Babbar Khalsa International led by Talwinder Singh Parmar. However, despite the distinction, the report describes the BK/BKI as a single movement with same puritan religious character and goals.
 An inquiry by the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Research Directorate found that sources did not report any differences between the BK and the BKI.
 According to an article by Professor Shinder Purewal, in 1978 Talwinder Singh Parmar and Sukhdev Singh Babbar “founded a terrorist organization called Babbar Khalsa.” Mr. Parmar then organized Babbar Khalsa in Canada in 1981.
 According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the BK was founded in 1978:
Since that time the Babbar Khalsa has broken into factions and today, two main groups with similar names and objectives exist, being the BK and the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI). Over the years the distinction between the two groups and their activities/sympathizers, both in India and abroad, has blurred to the point that the names are often used synonymously [emphasis mine]….There are also factions of each group located in Europe and North America.
Despite its references to two distinct groups and to factions, this CSIS report, within a single chapter entitled “Babbar Khalsa”, for the most part treats the two as the same entity, and provides little if any reason to distinguish the two or any factions. The report says the “Canadian arm” of the BK was established by Talwinder Singh Parmar in 1979.
 According to India Today, Sukhdev Singh Babbar, Talwinder Parmar and two others were founding members of the Babbar Khalsa International, which formed its first armed unit under Mr. Parmar in Canada in 1981.
 Similarly, another report says that the BKI was founded by Sukhdev Singh Babbar and Talwinder Singh Parmar, with the first unit of the BKI founded in Canada in 1981 under Parmar’s leadership. It says the BKI is active in the USA, Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, Norway, Switzerland and Pakistan. According to this report, Mr. Parmar split from the BKI in 1992 and founded the BKI(Parmar) faction.
 In her Ph.D. dissertation, Therese Suhashini Gunawardena recounts the history of the Babbar Khalsa International, saying that the BK was formed in 1978 and that the BKI has a presence in Vancouver, Toronto, New York and California, London, and other parts of Europe. According to her, “despite the diasporan context within which it operates, the extremely secretive Babbar Khalsa has maintained intimate ties to its parent organization in the Punjab.” She says that Talwinder Singh Parmar established a BKI branch in Vancouver. Like other accounts, hers does not clearly distinguish between the BK and the BKI.
 I acknowledge, but give little weight to, a report quoting a British chief superintendent about an interview he allegedly conducted in 1985 with Babbar Khalsa member Ajaib Singh Bagri, in which Mr. Bagri allegedly claimed that the Babbar Khalsa in England, under the leadership of Mr. Gill, was separate from the Canadian organization and that Bagri was trying to unite the British and Canadian Babbar Khalsa groups under Parmar’s leadership. This hearsay evidence cannot be accorded much weight; I do not have Mr. Bagri’s own statement, or even the chief superintendent’s, but only a report of a report of an alleged statement. It is not surprising if there were rivalries and internal politics within the BK/BKI, and Mr. Parmar in particular apparently had a complicated relationship with other BK/BKI leaders, including (from Mr. Gill’s own statements) Mr. Gill, but this does not indicate that the Babbar Khalsa in England was in fact a separate organization from the BK/BKI generally; if anything, it suggests that the Parmar faction in Canada was somewhat distinct from the rest of the organization.
 Despite his attempts to distinguish them, Mr. Gill himself has not been consistent in his own use of the terms Babbar Khalsa and Babbar Khalsa International. In a written statement in 2001, Mr. Gill said “I was a leader of Babar Khalsa Int. [“Int.” was clarified by the interpreter at the admissibility hearing] approximately from June 1984-1992 in England.” In statements to the Vancouver Sun that same year, he said that he was no longer affiliated with the Babbar Khalsa International but referred to having represented Babbar Khalsa in England. At a 2013 interview with CBSA, he stated that he was in Babbar Khalsa from 1982 to 1994. During a 2012 interview with CBSA, he said, “I left BK in 1992.” In an application for a Canadian temporary resident visa in 2012, Mr. Gill listed himself as a “member” of “Babbar Khalsa” in the UK from 1978-82, and made no mention of the BKI. At his admissibility hearing, he said that there was no BKI branch in the UK, and that he was never a member of BKI; this is in direct contrast to his 2001 statement above and to a 2011 statement, below.
 In a 2011 declaration relating to an application for a Ministerial exception pursuant to subsection 34(2) of the Act, Mr. Gill described the BKI as
a diaspora organization of Sikhs supportive of self determination for the Punjab. It had groups operating, pretty much on their own, in a number of countries around the world and even presently Babbar Khalsa is not deemed a terrorist group in Germany. I was involved in the BKI-UK which I left in January, 1992….The BKI is not the same organization as the Babbar Khalsa.
It is noteworthy that, in this statement, Mr. Gill described the BKI as a single organization comprising a number of chapters around the world. Although in this statement Mr. Gill denied that the BKI and the BK were the same organization, the reference here to the BK branch in Germany is interesting. If the BK and BKI were not the same organization, it would not make sense, when describing the BKI, to refer to the Babbar Khalsa (rather than Babbar Khalsa International) in Germany.
 In the same 2011 declaration, Mr. Gill stated that he became a member of Babbar Khalsa in 1978, but that he left the BK shortly after moving to Canada in 1982, because he did not agree with Talwinder Singh Parmar.
 For his admissibility hearing, Mr. Gill provided a letter of support from a Mr. Balbir Singh; this letter is inconsistent with Mr. Gill’s statement cited in the paragraph above. Mr. Singh writes that Mr. Gill was the first president of Babbar Khalsa in the UK from 1983 until 1992, with Mr. Singh then serving as president “till it got banned by the British government in 2001.” Mr. Singh refers to Babbar Khalsa, not to the Babbar Khalsa International. In any case, other sources refer to either the BK or the BKI being banned in the UK in 2001, confirming that there is no meaningful distinction between the BK and the BKI.
 Dr. Atar Singh Dhillon, an acquaintance and relative of Mr. Gill by marriage, testified for Mr. Gill at the admissibility hearing. According to Dr. Dhillon, the name Babbar Khalsa has been “used by a lot of groups everywhere.” Dr. Dhillon said that the various Babbar Khalsa groups in Germany, Canada, and the UK “are completely different people just using the name Babbar Khalsa because they happen to somehow know Fauja Singh.” Dr. Dhillon said that Mr. Gill’s group was not connected to any of the other Babbar Khalsa groups around the world, and that the various Babbar Khalsa groups in different countries “are not even thinking that deep” about using the name Babbar Khalsa or Babbar Khalsa International. He said these groups “don’t even know each other’s policies. They never meet, never do conferences.”
 Mr. Navdej Singh Gill, Mr. Gill’s son, also testified at the admissibility hearing. He said that his father did not work with any other BK groups or the BKI, and never met with them.
 In his testimony, Mr. Gill also denied he ever had meetings or conferences or anything to do with other BK groups. He said that the decision of his group in the United Kingdom to use the name Babbar Khalsa had nothing to do with groups in other countries.
 However, I am not persuaded by this testimony about the structure of the Babbar Khalsa internationally or the alleged lack of connections among the various countries’ chapters. This evidence is outweighed by the bulk of the evidence before me. In addition to the descriptions of the BK/BKI from various sources already cited above detailing the organization’s international reach, it is clear from Mr. Gill’s own history that there are substantial connections among BK/BKI chapters in various countries, and that Mr. Gill and the BK/BKI in the UK have interacted with BK/BKI chapters in other countries.
 For example, Mr. Gill attended a pro-Khalistan conference in California in 1986. In testimony, Mr. Gill said that a Mr. Sukhdev Singh Bainiwal was also at that conference, and accompanied Mr. Gill to the Canadian border, where they were stopped. Although Mr. Gill testified that Mr. Bainiwal was not a BK member “because in 1986 Babbar Khalsa was non-existent”, numerous sources state that the BK was founded before 1986, and in fact when interviewed at the Canadian border Mr. Bainiwal (a resident of the United States) self-identified as a BK member; also, a jacket with “Babbar Khalsa International” and the organization’s crossed-rifles emblem was found in their car.
 Similarly, Mr. Gill admits to attending a meeting in Germany with other Babbar Khalsa members, including Mr. Resham Singh, the leader of the German branch, whom he identified from the photographs in Exhibit C2 taken at that meeting. The first photograph in this exhibit shows a Babbar Khalsa International banner emblazoned with the organization’s crossed-rifles emblem; the third photograph in this exhibit clearly shows Mr. Singh and the other participants standing in front of the same banner.
 Furthermore, the pro-Khalistan movement of which the BK/BKI was a part was clearly spread among the Sikh diaspora, and there was active engagement, dialogue, cooperation (and competition) among pro-Khalistan groups in various countries. After the Indian government’s attack on the Sikh’s Golden Temple in Amritsar, there were mass protests in Western capitals, Sikh temples in other countries funneled money to separatist groups, and large numbers of Sikhs joined pro-Khalistan organizations. These events were widely reported, as shown by the many articles disclosed for this hearing. For example, Mr. Gill submitted a news article quoting his plans to meet “with many of Canada’s 350,000 Sikhs” when he was stopped at the border with Mr. Bainiwal. He submitted another article describing an an
 nual conference in the UK “addressed by members of the Babar Khalsa International, All India Sikh Students Federation, Khalistan Liberation Force and Khalistan Commando Force.” While denying any discussions between BK in the UK and BK in India and Canada, Mr. Gill acknowledged in his testimony that he was aware of the Babbar Khalsa presence in those countries, via the media.
 Given this evidence of extensive media coverage of the global pro-Khalistani movement, of the existence of various pro-Khalistan organizations, and of interactions among branches of the BK/BKI (including Mr. Gill’s admission of meeting BK members in Germany), it is disingenuous to suggest that BK/BKI groups devoted to Khalistan independence happened to choose the same name by coincidence “without thinking that deep”, and it is not believable that there were no connections between the various BK/BKI groups in different countries, or that Mr. Gill’s group in the United Kingdom chose the name without thinking of its use by others (sharing the same objective) elsewhere. I find, rather, that the BK/BKI groups in various countries were national chapters of the same organization, as the bulk of the documentary sources indicate.
 I accept, however, that the BK/BKI was a very loosely-structured and informal organization. According to Mr. Gill’s testimony, there were no membership lists and the organization itself was not registered in the UK. I accept that the various chapters of the organization in different countries may have operated with significant degrees of autonomy, each focusing on raising support from members of its local Sikh diaspora and on lobbying the government of its host country. That said, the BK/BKI had a unique identity distinct from other pro-Khalistan organizations. BK/BKI chapters around the world seem to have operated mostly in cooperation with each other under the same name and banner, sharing the same religious conservatism and more importantly the same ultimate political objective. For the purposes of paragraph 34(1)(f) there is no requirement for membership cards, official registration, or a formal hierarchy. There is sufficient evidence before me to establish reasonable grounds that the BK/BKI is a distinct organization, although loosely structured.
 In short, the numerous reports from independent sources, including Canadian government sources, as well as Mr. Gill’s own past statements, indicate that there is no meaningful distinction to be drawn between the Babbar Khalsa and the Babbar Khalsa International, and outweigh the testimony to the contrary of Mr. Gill and his witnesses at the admissibility hearing. I conclude therefore that for the purposes of paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act, there are reasonable grounds to believe that Babbar Khalsa and Babbar Khalsa International are merely different names for the same organization.
Terrorist activities of the BK/BKI
 Suresh provides the definition of “terrorism” for the purposes of subsection 34(1) of IRPA: it is an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
 The Canadian government lists Babbar Khalsa International (“also known as Babbar Khalsa”) as a terrorist entity, and says its “activities include armed attacks, assassinations, and bombings. BKI has members outside of India in Pakistan, North America, Europe, and Scandinavia.” Elsewhere, the BKI is described as “an organization of Sikh separatists associated with a wave of assassinations and terrorist attacks in the 1980s. The group’s primary goal is the establishment of an independent Sikh country of unspecified size in northwestern India.”
 According to the documentary evidence before me, the BK/BKI has claimed responsibility for a number of deadly attacks deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants, in order to achieve its aim of forcing the Indian government to grant Khalistan independence. For example, in 1986, the BK claimed responsibility for the murder of a 15 year old son of a police officer, to protest police torture of jailed Sikh youths, and warned of further violence if any harm came to a suspect arrested for the massacre of 22 bus passengers in Punjab. That same year, the Babbar Khalsa claimed responsibility for the murder of a Hindu political activist in his shop, as part of an anti-government/anti-Hindu campaign. “More than 500 people, mostly Hindus, have been killed this year in Punjab by separatists…in what officials believe is a drive to terrify the minority community into fleeing the Sikh-dominated state.” Also in 1986, but in Canada, two self-acknowledged Babbar Khalsa members were convicted for conspiracy to commit murder for plotting to bomb a New York-New Delhi Air India flight. They were sentenced the following year to life in prison for conspiring to blow up a plane leaving a US airport. “Hundreds of innocent bystanders would have been killed” said the judge. The two accused admitted membership in Babbar Khalsa.
 Between 1988 and 1995 there were at least nine BKI attacks, including bombings of private citizens and property, causing multiple fatalities. According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the BKI was responsible for the 1992 kidnapping and killing of a radio employee, for the assassination of Punjab’s Chief Minister and 15 of his staff, and later for a “spree of vengeance,” killing policemen and their family members in retaliation for killing of Sukhdev Singh Babbar. The assassination of the Chief Minister in 1995, by suicide car bombing, is confirmed by other sources.
 The most famous terrorist attack usually attributed to the Babbar Khalsa is the 1985 bombing of Air India flight 182. However, most of the sources in evidence before me say merely that the BK is suspected of the 1985 Air India bombing. In any case, for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for me to determine if this was a BK attack, as the other reports listed above suffice to establish that the Babbar Khalsa has engaged in terrorism, as that term is defined in Suresh. These reports provide reasonable grounds to believe that the BK/BKI deliberately killed civilians and other non-combatants in order to intimidate the non-Sikh population of Punjab and to induce the Indian government to recognize an independent Khalistan.
 The term “member” as used in paragraph 34(1)(f) is not defined in the Act, but has been analyzed at some length in Canadian case law. The term has been interpreted broadly, and is not confined to official or formal membership. In Suresh the Supreme Court said, “Membership cannot and should not be narrowly interpreted when it involves the issue of Canada’s national security. Membership also does not only refer to persons who have engaged or who might engage in terrorist activities.” In Singh the Federal Court declared, “It is trite to say that terrorist organizations do not issue membership cards. There is no formal test for membership and members are not therefore easily identifiable.” In Poshteh the Federal Court of Appeal found that “member” under the Act should be interpreted broadly, based on the rationale in Singh and the availability of the exemption provided for in subsection 34(2) of the Act. However, in Sinnaiah, the Court said, “To establish ‘membership’ in an organization, there must at least be evidence of an ‘institutional link’ with, or ‘knowing participation’ in, the group’s activities.”
 According to the Federal Court of Appeal in Chiau, the term “member” does not require actual or formal membership coupled with active participation. Rather, being a “member” means “belonging”. However, since secret, undisclosed information was used in Chiau, it is impossible to tell from the Court’s reasons what set of facts led to the determination of Mr. Chiau’s membership. In Tharmavarathan, the Court concluded that a finding of membership in the LTTE was not supported if one considered the person’s involvement, the length of time he was involved, and the degree of his commitment to the organization and its objectives. These three criteria for membership have been adopted in subsequent jurisprudence. Thus, for example, Krishnamoorthy summarizes the analysis necessary to determine membership:
The jurisprudence points to a number of criteria – involvement, length of time, degree of commitment – that defines what membership in a broad sense may be. Not every act of support for a group that there are reasonable grounds to believe is involved in terrorist activities will constitute membership.
 In assessing a person’s degree of commitment to an organization, a determinative issue is whether or not the person’s actions were voluntary and intended to assist the organization in the achievement of its aims. In Jalloh, the Federal Court said that At a minimum, a member is someone who intentionally carries out acts in furtherance of the group’s goals …. the finding of membership should rest on indicia that the person’s intentions were consonant with the group’s objects.
 Similarly, in Basaki, the Court specified that the criterion “degree of commitment to the goals and objectives” of the group “must consider whether a person voluntarily acted in support of the organization.” The Court emphasized that “the factors put forward to analyze the facts of a case in relation to membership in a terrorist organization include whether or not an individual acted voluntarily. It is an important factor to evaluate and a Board member must consider it.”
 Much of the evidence pointing to Mr. Gill’s membership in the BK/BKI has already been cited earlier in these reasons. I will not repeat it here. Mr. Gill’s involvement with the BK/BKI lasted for more than a decade, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. His statements over the years (see above in these reasons) have not been completely consistent in terms of exactly when he joined and left the organization, but it is clear that he was a member for a significant number of years. Despite Mr. Gill’s statement that the BKI is not the same as the BK, I think it more likely that, although he may have stopped participating with the Canadian branch of the BK in 1982 because of philosophical differences, he remained involved with the larger international BK/BKI into the 1990s.
 Mr. Gill’s involvement in the BK/BKI was considerable. According to his own testimony, he was one of the five founders of its UK chapter in 1984. As noted earlier in these reasons, he became president of the UK chapter, and held that position for several years. In his testimony he described himself as a leader of the BK in the UK, and in some sense as an inheritor of Fauja Singh’s leadership mantle. He was also involved, for a short time at least, with the BK in Canada.
 Mr. Gill’s membership in the Babbar Khalsa was voluntary and intended to assist the achievement of the organization’s primary goal: the establishment of the independent state of Khalistan. Mr. Gill’s intended goal was the same as the Babbar Khalsa’s, whether or not he personally supported all the means (including terrorist violence) that the organization employed to achieve it.
 Mr. Gill’s avowed commitment to following the laws of the UK and Canada, or his involvement in maintaining peaceful relations between Sikh activists and police, or his condemnation of the 9-11 attacks, or his association with government figures in the UK, or his moral character and personal commitment to non-violence, are not relevant to the determination of this case. The issue in this case is not whether Mr. Gill himself is a terrorist or sympathetic to terrorism, but that he was a member of an organization that engaged in terrorism.
 That said, I find it likely that Mr. Gill was aware of the BK/BKI’s terrorist actions during his tenure with the organization, whether or not he approved of them. Mr. Gill was a prominent member of the BK/BKI, had personal connections to its leadership in various countries, travelled extensively, attended conferences, and was actively engaged with the media. The same media reported on Mr. Gill’s activities and on the pro-Khalistan movement, including terrorist attacks and other violence associated with the strife in Punjab, as both parties’ evidence shows. It is difficult to believe that Mr. Gill could have been unaware of the terrorist activities perpetrated by the BK/BKI in the 1980s and early 1990s, yet he remained a prominent member of the organization for many years. Even if Mr. Gill was comparatively moderate and did not approve of those tactics himself, he continued to belong to the organization.
 Given Mr. Gill’s integral involvement over many years and his commitment to the organization’s goals, I find that he was a member of the BK/BKI for the purposes of paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act.
 The evidence before me provides reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Gill was a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe has engaged in terrorism. Therefore, he is inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 34(1)(f) by (c) of the Act.
NOTICE OF DECISION
 I am required, pursuant to paragraphs 45(d) of IRPA and 229(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, to issue a deportation order against Mr. Gill. The deportation order is attached to these reasons.
Appeal and judicial review – If you hold a permanent resident visa or if you are a permanent resident or a protected person, you may have the right under subsection 7(2) of the Immigration Division Rules to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division from this decision in accordance with section 63 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. If you do not have the right to appeal, you have the right pursuant to section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to make an application to the Federal Court for judicial review of this decision, with leave of that Court. You may wish to get advice from counsel as soon as possible, since there are time limits for this application.
Exh. C1, at p. 4.
Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40.
Exh. C1, at pp. 6-9.
Exh. C1, at p. 95.
Exh. P1, at p. 109; Exh. C1, at p. 120.
Exh. C1, at p. 97.
Exh. C3, at p. 109 (NB: for convenience and clarity, in this case I have used the source article’s page numbers rather than the disclosure’s faxed page numbers).
Exh. C1, at p. 178.
Exh. C1, at p. 101.
Exh. C1, at p. 131.
Exh. C1, at p. 108.
Exh. C1, at p. 109.
Exh. C1, at pp. 45-46.
See, for example, Exh. C1, at pp. 109-110.
Exh. C1, at p. 131.
Exh. C1, at pp. 71-73.
Exh. C1, at p. 75.
Exh. C1, at p. 19.
Exh. C1, at p. 63.
Exh. C1, p. 55.
Exh. C1, at p. 36.
Exh. C1, at p. 35.
Exh. P1, at p. 51.
Exh. C1, at p. 45, 75,
According to Mr. Gill and Dr. Dhillon, Fauja Singh was instrumental in the establishment of the Babbar Khalsa movement.
Exh. C1, at pp. 84-87.
Exh. C1, p. 115; Exh. C3, p. 110.
Exh. P1, at p. 81.
Exh. P1, at p. 80.
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1.
Exh. C1, at pp. 94-95.
Exh. C1, at pp. 100, 147.
Exh. C1, at p. 198.
Exh. C1, at p. 204.
Exh. C1, at pp. 202, 206-207.
Exh. C1, at p. 147.
Exh. C1, at p. 178.
Exh. C1, at pp. 123, 131.
Exh. C1, at pp. 101, 120, 147, 179, 180, etc.
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh (1998), 151 FTR 101
Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 85
Sinnaiah v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1576
Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (T.D.),  2 F.C. 642
Tharmavarathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 985
Krishnamoorthy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1342
Basaki v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 397
Jalloh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 317