COMMISSIONER Marie-Josée Hogue in her final report on foreign interference in Canada said that “the government’s response has been far from perfect,” pointing out:
• The government has sometimes taken too long to act, and that coordination between the various players involved has not always been optimal.
• Processes by which information had to be passed on to certain decision-makers, including elected officials, have not proved as effective as they should have been.
• The government has proven to be a poor communicator and insufficiently transparent when it comes to foreign interference.
She added: “The measures implemented over the past two years, along with several statements made on the matter, suggest that the government is now prioritizing the fight against foreign interference. This must continue.”
The government established the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions on September 7, 2023, and appointed Hogue as Commissioner.
Hogue said that Canada’s democratic institutions have thus far remained robust.
She noted: “Although there are a very small number of isolated cases where foreign interference may have had some impact on the outcome of a nomination contest or the result of an election in a given riding, there is no evidence to suggest that our institutions have been seriously affected by such interference or that parliamentarians owe their successful election to foreign entities. While any attempted interference is troubling, I am reassured by the minimal impact such efforts have had to date.’
She said: “Nor have I seen any evidence of “traitors” in Parliament plotting with foreign states to act against Canada. Although a few cases involving things like attempts to curry favour with parliamentarians have come to light, the phenomenon remains marginal and largely ineffective. I am not aware of any federal legislation, regulations or policies that have been enacted or repealed on account of foreign interference. While the states’ attempts are troubling and there is some concerning conduct by parliamentarians, there is no cause for widespread alarm.”
Hogue added: “Fortunately, I did not come across a situation where a parliamentarian decided not to speak out, or expressed an opinion that was not really their own, out of fear of reprisals from foreign actors. However I attribute this to the courage of our elected officials, because the risk is real – particularly given the potential for retaliatory disinformation campaigns by foreign states.”
Hogue also pointed out that although Canada has not faced the level and extent of national security threats that many of its allies have up until now, “there is no guarantee that this will always be the case, and indeed, at this point in time it seems unlikely to continue.”
She said that Canadians need to be better informed, adding: “The Commission’s experience has shown that a great deal of information can be made public without compromising national security, as several witnesses from the national security and intelligence community who appeared before me readily acknowledged. This work is certainly both challenging and difficult, but it is essential if we are to preserve the health of our democracy.”
ON INDIAN INTERFERENCE
“India is the second most active country engaging in electoral foreign interference in Canada.
“Like the PRC [People’s Republic of China], India is a critical actor on the world stage. Canada and India have worked together for decades, but there are challenges in the relationship. Many of these are long standing and inform India’s foreign interference activities. India perceives Canada as not taking India’s national security concerns about Khalistani separatism (the goal of an independent Sikh homeland in northern India called “Khalistan”) sufficiently seriously.
“India focuses its foreign interference activities on the Indo-Canadian community and on prominent non-Indo-Canadians to achieve its objectives. This interference has targeted all levels of government.
“Like the PRC, India conducts foreign interference through diplomatic officials in Canada and through proxies. A body of intelligence indicates that proxy agents may have, and may continue to be, clandestinely providing illicit financial support to various Canadian politicians in an attempt to secure the election of pro-India candidates or gain influence over candidates who take office. The intelligence does not necessarily indicate that the elected officials or candidates involved were aware of the interference attempts, or that the attempts necessarily succeeded.
“India also uses disinformation as a key form of foreign interference against Canada, a tactic likely to be used more often in the future.
“Until recently, Canada was trying to improve its bilateral relationship with India. However, the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, coupled with credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the Government of India and Mr. Nijjar’s death, derailed those efforts. India has repeatedly denied these allegations.
“In October 2024, Canada expelled six Indian diplomats and consular officials in reaction to a targeted campaign against Canadian citizens by agents linked to the Government of India.”
ON PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE
“Pakistan’s foreign interference activities are opportunistic and relate to the poor relationship between Pakistan and India. Pakistan engages in foreign interference in Canada to promote stability in Pakistan and to counter India’s growing influence. Its activities target various facets of Canadian society and all levels of government. For now, Pakistan is more likely to rely on local community elements, rather than cyber measures or artificial intelligence, to facilitate its foreign interference.”
ON CHINESE INTERFERENCE
At the time of writing this report, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the most active perpetrator of foreign interference targeting Canada’s democratic institutions. The PRC views Canada as a high-priority target.
After the arbitrary detention of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, Canada’s diplomatic relations with the PRC changed dramatically. However, the PRC is also inescapably an important actor on the global stage. Since the release of both men in 2021, Canada and the PRC have been attempting to come to terms with their damaged relationship.
PRC foreign interference is wide-ranging. It targets all levels of government in Canada. Canadian security and intelligence officials view the PRC as generally “party agnostic”: it supports those it believes helpful to its interests at the time, and those it believes are likely to have power, no matter their political party.
The PRC uses a wide range of actors for foreign interference. Both its Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security operate covertly internationally. The PRC also acts through its diplomatic officials. The United Front Work Department, formally a department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), tries to control and influence Chinese diaspora communities, shape international opinions and influence politicians to support PRC policies.
The PRC relies on proxies, individuals or organizations, taking explicit or implicit direction from it to engage in foreign interference.
The PRC poses the most sophisticated and active cyber threat to Canada and CSIS assesses it as increasingly using social media and the Internet for disinformation campaigns involving elections.

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RUBY Sahota, Minister of Democratic Institutions, and David McGuinty, Minister of Public Safety, said in a statement that the federal government welcomed the Final Report’s findings, which reaffirmed that the 2019 and 2021 federal elections were free and fair.
They added: “However, it is clear that our democracy faces a continuous and escalating threat from foreign actors who seek to undermine our sovereignty and destabilize our institutions.”
The ministers said: “This Inquiry has shed light on our government’s historic efforts to protect Canada from this landscape. This includes initiatives such as the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP), the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and others—all designed to safeguard future elections from both emerging and entrenched threats.”
They said that the government is taking further action to protect election integrity with the following investments:
- $44 million, starting in 2025-26, and $9.8 million ongoing, for the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, to ensure a sufficient investigation capacity to protect against persistent threats to the electoral process, such as foreign interference and disinformation
- $27.5 million, starting in 2025-26, with a temporary increase of $2 million in 2025-26, for Canadian Heritage’s Digital Citizen Initiative to fund projects that build citizen resilience against online disinformation
- $5.95 million, starting in 2024-25, for Global Affairs Canada’s Rapid Response Mechanism to bolster its capacity to monitor and strengthen defenses of the Canadian open-source information ecosystem and keep Canadians informed of possible foreign interference during the election
They noted: “Moreover, with the passage of Bill C-70, An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference, we are taking significant steps to bolster our defenses against new and insidious forms of foreign meddling. This legislation criminalizes interference activities, enhances information-sharing capabilities, and establishes a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry. Additionally, the government’s newly published Mandate Letter for the National Security and Intelligence Advisor strengthens coordination across Canada’s national security and intelligence agencies, ensuring a unified response to these growing challenges.”